The state of Qin attacked Yiyang in the state of Han. King Nan of Zhou said to Zhao Lei, "What do you think of this matter?" Zhao Lei replied, "Yiyang will surely fall." The King said, "Yiyang's city wall is eight li in circumference, with a hundred thousand elite soldiers, grain sufficient for several years, and Han's Gongzhong has two hundred thousand troops. Moreover, General Jing Cui of Chu has led his army to camp in the mountains and is coming to its aid. Qin will certainly not succeed." Zhao Lei said, "Gan Mao is a guest minister residing in Qin. If he attacks Yiyang and succeeds, he could become a figure like the Duke of Zhou; if he fails, he will be expelled from Qin. The King of Qin disregarded the objections of his ministers and clan elders and insisted on attacking Yiyang. If Yiyang is not taken, the King of Qin will feel shame. Therefore, I say Yiyang will fall." The King said, "Plan for me—what should be done?" Zhao Lei said, "You should say to Jing Cui: 'You hold the rank of Gui, and serve as the pillar of the state. If you win, there is nothing more to be conferred upon you; if you lose, you will die in battle. It would be better to betray Qin and aid Yiyang. If you advance your troops, Qin, fearing that you will strike while it is weary, will surely offer you treasures to serve you. Han's Gongzhong, grateful that you resist Qin on his behalf, will surely also present treasures.'" Later, when Qin took Yiyang, Jing Cui indeed advanced his troops. Qin, in fear, hastily offered the city of Zhuzhao, and Han indeed presented precious treasures. Jing Cui gained the city from Qin and treasures from Han, and was grateful to Eastern Zhou.
💡 商战启示录
The essence of this strategy lies in seizing the fulcrum of balanced interests within a multi-party game to maximize one's own gains. In modern commercial warfare, this mirrors the classic dynamic of "when the clam and the crane grapple, the fisherman reaps the profit." For instance, during the subsidy war between Didi and Kuaidi, both sides burned vast sums to capture market share, while third-party payment platforms such as Alipay and WeChat Pay quietly expanded their user bases, reaping the spoils without entering the fray. Similarly, in e-commerce, the price war between Dangdang and JD.com eroded both parties' margins, whereas Suning and Gome seized the moment to launch "same price online and offline" campaigns, attracting price-sensitive consumers and boosting their own market presence. Zhao Lei's wisdom lies in refraining from direct confrontation, instead leveraging information asymmetry to make Jing Cui recognize his own value as the "pivotal third party," thereby maneuvering deftly between Qin and Han. Business leaders should learn to identify such "critical moments"—when competitors are locked in attrition, one may adopt a stance of "watch and pressure," compelling both sides to court your support, thereby extracting additional concessions or superior partnership terms. Moreover, one must skillfully exploit the fears and needs of others: just as Qin feared Jing Cui exploiting its vulnerabilities and Han sought Jing Cui to restrain Qin, Jing Cui turned this mutual deterrence into leverage for resources. Modern enterprises can apply the same principle—whether in supply-chain negotiations or strategic alliances, they should refrain from hastily choosing sides, instead positioning themselves as an indispensable balancing force, thereby commanding the initiative at the bargaining table.