第35篇 楚请道于二周之间

出处:战国策·西周策

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📜 原文(文言文)

楚请道于二周之间,将起兵以临韩、魏。周君患之。或谓周君曰:“不如令太子以正行,以和于楚,而请其道以假之。楚若听,则是吾得交于楚也;楚若不听,则是吾绝于楚也。绝于楚,则韩、魏必重周,而楚亦不敢轻周矣。且夫楚之欲得地于韩、魏久矣,今请道,是欲借道以伐韩、魏也。若与之,则是与楚为市也,而韩、魏必怨周;若不与,则楚必怒,而韩、魏亦未必德周。故不如和楚而请道,使楚自择。楚若听,则吾结楚之欢,而韩、魏之怨,楚自当之;楚若不听,则楚自绝于周,而韩、魏必亲周。此策之善者也。”周君曰:“善。”乃使太子请道于楚,楚王许之。

📖 白话文翻译

The State of Chu requested passage through the territories of the Eastern and Western Zhou, intending to launch an attack against the states of Han and Wei. The Lord of Zhou was troubled by this. A counselor said to him: "Better to send the Crown Prince on a formal mission to Chu, expressing goodwill while requesting passage. If Chu agrees, then we have established diplomatic ties with Chu; if Chu refuses, then Chu has severed relations with us. Should Chu sever relations, Han and Wei are certain to hold Zhou in high regard, and Chu would not dare to slight Zhou either. Moreover, Chu has long sought to acquire lands from Han and Wei; now it requests passage, intending to use it to attack them. If we grant passage, it would be tantamount to trading with Chu, and Han and Wei would surely bear resentment against Zhou; if we refuse, Chu would inevitably grow angry, yet Han and Wei would not necessarily feel gratitude toward Zhou. Thus it is better to befriend Chu and request passage, letting Chu make its own choice. If Chu agrees, we maintain friendship with Chu, and the resentment of Han and Wei falls naturally upon Chu; if Chu refuses, Chu itself severs its bond with Zhou, and Han and Wei will surely draw close to Zhou. This is the superior strategy." The Lord of Zhou said, "Well spoken." He then dispatched the Crown Prince to request passage from Chu, and the King of Chu consented.

💡 商战启示录

Zhou found itself wedged between the contending ambitions of great powers, its predicament akin to a modern enterprise maneuvering within the intricate web of supply-chain rivalries. Rather than outright rejecting Chu’s demands, Zhou chose to extend goodwill and place the decision squarely upon Chu, thereby shifting the burden of risk onto the other party. The lesson for businesses is clear: when confronted by a formidable partner, one should neither hastily pick sides nor meet force with force, but instead devise a mechanism whereby the opponent’s own choice becomes one’s leverage. In commercial negotiations, for instance, one might present an open-ended proposal that compels the adversary, through careful weighing of gains and losses, to yield of its own accord—thus securing the initiative for oneself. By allowing Chu to pass through its territory, Zhou averted the resentment of Han and Wei while preserving its ties with Chu, much as a corporation, through strategic alliances, avoids head-on clashes with competitors yet retains its market agility. At the same time, Zhou exploited Chu’s territorial ambitions toward Han and Wei, turning Chu’s actions into a lever for its own diplomacy. Modern enterprises may draw upon this stratagem: amid multi-party games, by leveraging information asymmetry and astute interest analysis, they can steer rivals toward decisions favorable to themselves—even transforming an opponent’s expansion into an opportunity to enhance their own bargaining power. The crux lies not in blunt refusal, but in creating conditions under which the other party bears the consequences of its own choices, thereby safeguarding one’s own interests.