King Xi of Yan appointed Li Fu as a minister and sent him on a mission to the state of Zhao. Upon his return, Li Fu reported: "The able-bodied men of Zhao all perished in the Battle of Changping, and their orphans have not yet grown to maturity. We may attack them." The King of Yan summoned Changguo Jun Yue Jian to consult him on this matter. Yue Jian replied: "Zhao is a state open to all four directions, and its people are well-versed in military affairs. One cannot wage war against them." The King of Yan said: "If I attack them with twice their strength, would that be permissible?" Yue Jian answered: "No." The King of Yan said: "What if I use three times their strength?" Yue Jian answered: "No." The King of Yan flew into a rage. All the ministers at court held that Zhao could be attacked, and so the King of Yan swiftly raised an army of six hundred thousand to invade Zhao. He ordered Li Fu to lead four hundred thousand troops against the city of Hao, and dispatched Qing Qin to lead two hundred thousand troops against the city of Dai. Zhao sent Lian Po with eighty thousand men to confront Li Fu at Hao, and Yue Cheng with fifty thousand men to confront Qing Qin at Dai. The Yan army suffered a great defeat. Yue Jian fled to Zhao. The King of Yan wrote a letter reproaching him and offering apologies, but Yue Jian also replied to the King of Yan, saying: "I have heard that the wise do not act against the tide of the times to abandon advantage, the brave do not destroy their reputation out of fear of death, and loyal ministers do not put themselves before their sovereign. Now the King lays the blame for the state's affairs upon me, and I fear that the scholars of the world, upon hearing of this, will not believe it. I have heard that the flounder fish, if they do not cooperate with each other, cannot swim; thus the ancients praised them because of their mutual coordination. Now between the King and myself, there is no such harmony as that of the flounder, yet if we seek to demand such from one another, is that not difficult? I have heard that when a thousand-li steed grows old, a nag may run ahead of it; when Meng Ben is weary, a weak woman may overcome him. The nag and the weak woman are not lacking in sinew and bone strength, nor are they more worthy than the thousand-li steed or Meng Ben—why is this so? It is because the latter have exploited the exhaustion of the former. I have heard that with a state of Yan three thousand li in extent, one wishes to contend against a state of Zhao one thousand li in extent—this scheme was already mistaken from the start. Moreover, I have heard that an enlightened sovereign does not conceal the merits of others, nor obscure the abilities of others. Now my ability is not equal to the perspicacity of Yue Yi, and the King's trust in me is not equal to his trust in Yue Yi. This being so, how dare I seek actual employment on the strength of an empty reputation? I have heard that those who are good at initiating are not necessarily good at completing, and those who are good at beginning are not necessarily good at ending. In former times, Wu Zixu's counsel was adopted by Helü, and so the King of Wu could journey far to Ying; but Fuchai did not act thus, and presented Wu Zixu with the Shu'lu sword to take his own life. Therefore, my leaving the King is not an act of betrayal, but rather a means to correct the King's righteousness. I hope the King will consider these matters."
💡 商战启示录
The core lesson in business warfare revealed herein is: decision-makers must not blindly expand based on surface data, nor may they heed only one voice while disregarding the objections of key advisors. King Yan Xi, relying solely on Li Fu's single assertion that "Zhao may be attacked," launched a hasty large-scale offensive without thoroughly investigating Zhao's true military strength—though Zhao had suffered defeat at Changping, renowned generals such as Lian Po still served—and without assessing his own organizational capacity, namely the insufficient coordination among his six hundred thousand troops. The result was utter catastrophe. In modern commerce, similar cases abound: a company, witnessing a competitor's crisis—such as a quality scandal—mistakenly perceives a market vacuum and aggressively expands capacity or initiates price wars, yet fails to examine its own supply chain, capital reserves, and brand resilience, only to sink deeper into the mire. Le Jian's counsel emphasized that "a doubled force will not suffice, nor will a tripled one," reflecting the principle that in business, "scale does not equal efficiency." Blindly piling resources against structural advantages—such as Zhao's elite troops and home-ground defense—often yields half the result with twice the effort. Le Jian's eventual departure serves as a warning: if an enterprise cannot accommodate dissenting voices and establish rational decision-making mechanisms, it will lose its most critical talent. Modern enterprises should institute "red team" protocols or independent risk-control departments to conduct adversarial review of major strategies, thereby avoiding strategic blind spots caused by unilateral executive fiat. Furthermore, Le Jian's letter employed the metaphor of "the latecomer's advantage," reminding us that competitive timing must be keenly discerned—strike when the opponent is weary, not when the opponent is at full strength. In sum, this chapter instructs entrepreneurs: before decisions, seek multi-dimensional verification; during decisions, heed professional dissent; after decisions, maintain correction mechanisms—otherwise, even the grandest strategic blueprint may collapse under the weight of obstinate self-will.