King Huai of Chu wished to make Gan Mao the prime minister of Qin, so Qin sent Xiang Shou to inform Chu, saying: "Our sovereign desires to see Gan Mao." The King of Chu asked Fan Huan, "I wish to place a prime minister in Qin—would Gan Mao be suitable?" Fan Huan replied, "He is not. Gan Mao is a loyal minister of Qin, and to Qin he is more than merely loyal. Moreover, Qin is powerful, and if Gan Mao serves there, should Qin employ him greatly, he will surely honor Chu and slight Qin. Now if Your Majesty seeks to place a prime minister in Qin and appoints Gan Mao, then Qin will surely repay Chu with esteem, and Gan Mao will likewise be used for Chu's benefit. It would be better to have the King of Qin appoint Xiang Shou as prime minister. Xiang Shou is a trusted confidant of Qin and is also on good terms with Chu. If Xiang Shou becomes prime minister, then Qin will surely value Chu, and Xiang Shou will also serve Chu's interests." The King of Chu was delighted and sent envoys to Qin to request that Xiang Shou be made prime minister. Qin ultimately appointed Xiang Shou as prime minister. As for Gan Mao, he could never return to Qin again and ultimately died in Wei.
💡 商战启示录
Fan Huan's strategy reveals the strategic value of "decisive power over key appointments" in modern business. King Chu sought to indirectly control Qin's policies by influencing the selection of its prime minister—much like modern enterprises that, through investment or partnership, place "their own people" in key positions within a partner's critical departments to steer decision-making. For instance, a tech giant investing in startups often demands board seats or veto power over key personnel, ensuring the investee's strategy aligns with its ecosystem and preempting rival interference. Fan Huan advised choosing Xiang Shou over Gan Mao because Xiang Shou, though pro-Qin, was amicable toward Chu and less capable than Gan Mao—echoing the game-theoretic strategy of "bolstering the weak to curb the strong" in business: selecting a partner of slightly lesser ability but greater goodwill reduces the risk of future backlash while securing one's own influence. Had Gan Mao been chosen, his superior competence and loyalty to Qin might have enabled him to shed Chu's influence once in power, or even turn the tables against Chu. In modern commerce, when direct competition is unfeasible, firms often weaken rivals by shaping their human-resource landscape—poaching key executives via headhunters, or backing moderate factions within a competitor's leadership to slow their strategic momentum. King Chu ultimately succeeded in making Xiang Shou Qin's prime minister, consolidating Chu-Qin relations in the short term, yet in the long run, this indirect control risked failing to truly safeguard Chu's interests due to Xiang Shou's inadequacy—a reminder that in orchestrating personnel dynamics, enterprises must balance "loyalty" against "competence," lest an overemphasis on controllability compromise strategic efficacy.