The King of Chu allied with the King of Qin to attack Han, throwing the state of Han into great terror. The King of Han dispatched Yangcheng Jun to Qin to offer apologies and request that the territory of Shangdang be ceded in exchange for peace. The King of Han instructed Han Yang to inform the governor of Shangdang, Jin Chu, saying: "Qin has sent two armies pressing toward Han, and Han can no longer hold out. Now the king has sent Yangcheng Jun to Qin to offer apologies, requesting that the territory of Shangdang be ceded for peace, and the envoy has already departed. Let the governor surrender Shangdang." Jin Chu replied, "I beg to mobilize all remaining defenders to resist the enemy; if we truly cannot withstand them, I shall die in battle." Han Yang hurried back to report this to the King of Han. The King said, "I have already given my word to the Marquis of Ying; to withhold now would be to deceive Qin." He therefore sent Feng Ting to replace Jin Chu. Feng Ting held the position for thirty days, then secretly sent an envoy to the King of Zhao, saying: "Han can no longer defend Shangdang and is about to surrender it to Qin, yet the people of Shangdang are unwilling to submit to Qin and would rather belong to Zhao. Now Shangdang comprises seventeen cities, which we wish to present to Your Majesty—may you deign to accept them." The King of Zhao was overjoyed and summoned the Lord of Pingyang, Zhao Bao, to deliberate. The Lord of Pingyang said, "Profit gained without cause is a source of calamity. I hope Your Majesty will not accept it." The King of Zhao replied, "Our armies have long been mobilized, and both ministers and commoners alike say, 'Accept it.'" Thus he accepted Shangdang. When Qin learned that Zhao had accepted Shangdang, it sent Wang He to attack Zhao. Zhao raised troops to meet the invasion, and the two sides clashed at Changping. Forty thousand Zhao soldiers surrendered to Qin, and the Qin army buried them all alive.
💡 商战启示录
This strategy reveals the classic traps of "bait tactics" and "miscalculation of risk" in commercial warfare. Feng Ting used Shangdang as bait, shifting the Qin-Qin contradiction onto Zhao—essentially a "risk transfer," packaging his own predicament as an "opportunity" to cast before an opponent. Zhao, coveting "unearned gains," ignored Lord Pingyang's warning of "disaster," and ultimately suffered the catastrophic defeat at Changping—much like a modern enterprise blindly acquiring "toxic assets" or taking on "dumped projects." Consider a company that, eager to seize market share, takes over a business line abandoned by a rival due to outdated technology, overlooking the debt and integration costs behind it, only to be dragged down. The wisdom of commercial warfare lies in this: when faced with a "free lunch" or "manna from heaven," one must conduct due diligence and stress tests, assessing the other party's motives—why would Feng Ting give it away for nothing? Why did the Qin army not take it? If the benefit appears illogical, a trap must lie beneath. At the same time, decisions must not be swayed by the collective fervor of "all ministers and people say accept it." One should remain as calm and independent as Lord Pingyang, weighing decisions by "opportunity cost" and "long-term risk," rather than rushing in due to short-term temptation or public pressure. A true strategist knows how to refuse "poisoned gifts" and build firewalls, keeping crises transferred by others firmly at the gate.