The King of Wei wished to draw close to Qin, yet bore aversion to Qi. He therefore sent an envoy to persuade the King of Qi, saying: “The King of Wei desires to befriend Qin, but harbors ill will toward Your Majesty. I pray that you will look into this matter.” The King of Qi replied: “That the King of Wei wishes to befriend Qin, I have heard, but dared not readily believe. Now that you come and speak of it, I perceive that the King of Wei indeed bears enmity toward Qi.” The envoy said: “I have heard that the wise do not defy the season and cast away advantage; the brave do not fear death and destroy their renown; the loyal do not put themselves before their sovereign. Now the King of Wei wishes to befriend Qin, and if Your Majesty desires to win Wei’s allegiance, then it were better to cultivate amity with Qin. Should Wei draw close to Qin, calamity would befall Qi. Your Majesty had best make a show of acceding to Wei, while secretly forging ties with Qin. Wei, relying on Qin, will then serve Qi, and Qi shall stand secure.” The King of Qi said: “Well spoken.” Thereupon he granted his assent to Wei.
💡 商战启示录
In this stratagem, the Wei envoy skillfully employed the tactics of "feigning attack in the east while striking in the west" and "leveraging momentum." By conveying to the King of Qi the message that "Wei intends to forge closer ties with Qin," he guided the Qi ruler to accept a plan of "outwardly befriending Wei while secretly aligning with Qin," ultimately achieving a balance whereby Wei neither offended Qi nor forfeited the potential support of Qin. In modern commercial warfare, this strategy often manifests as "strategic ambiguity" and "multi-party maneuvering." For instance, a technology company, during negotiations with a competitor, might deliberately leak signals of a possible partnership with another industry giant, compelling the rival to make concessions on cooperation terms, while simultaneously forging an alliance with a third party behind the scenes—thereby enhancing its own bargaining power. Similarly, in supply chain management, an enterprise may signal to multiple suppliers the possibility of "switching partners," prompting each to offer better prices or services, while retaining flexible options for itself. However, one must be wary that "excessive bluster" may damage credibility—just as the King of Qi, had he seen through the envoy's ruse, would have left Wei in a dilemma. Therefore, in applying this stratagem in commercial warfare, the key lies in "blending the real with the illusory"—the degree of information transparency must be carefully calibrated, exerting pressure on the other party while leaving room for maneuver, ultimately achieving a win-win outcome or maximizing one's own interests.