The state of Qin desired to attack Chu, yet feared the strength of Chu's forces. Thereupon, Qin sent Zhang Yi to persuade King Huai of Chu, saying: "If Your Majesty can sever your alliance with Qi and close the border passes, I am willing to offer the six hundred li of the Shangyu territory, and let maidens of Qin become your concubines. Qin and Chu shall be bound by marriage, and remain brother states forever." King Huai of Chu, greatly delighted, agreed. All his ministers came to offer congratulations, save for Chen Zhen, who alone expressed mourning. The King asked in anger: "Without expending a single soldier or blade, I have obtained six hundred li of land—why do you mourn?" Chen Zhen replied: "It is not as Your Majesty believes. As I see it, not only will the Shangyu territory not be obtained, but Qi and Qin shall unite; and should Qi and Qin unite, calamity shall befall us." The King asked: "What reasoning is there in this?" Chen Zhen said: "The reason Qin holds Chu in esteem is that Chu has Qi as its ally. Now if you sever ties with Qi, Chu shall stand isolated. How could Qin covet an isolated state and gift it six hundred li of land for nothing? When Zhang Yi returns to Qin, he will surely betray Your Majesty. Thus, to the north you sever ties with Qi, and to the west you invite calamity from Qin—the armies of both states shall descend upon us at once." The King heeded not, and sent Qu Gai westward to receive the territory. When Zhang Yi returned to Qin, he feigned a fall from his carriage and claimed illness, refusing to attend court. When the envoy of Chu came to demand the land, Zhang Yi said: "What I agreed with your King was six li—I never spoke of six hundred li." The Chu envoy returned in fury and reported this. The King of Chu, enraged, raised an army to attack Qin. Qin joined forces with Qi, and Chu suffered a great defeat at Duling.
💡 商战启示录
This strategy reveals the fatal traps of "information asymmetry" and "credulous commitment" in commercial warfare. Qin lured Chu with "illusory gains," inducing it to destroy its key alliance with Qi—a classic prototype of "feinting east while attacking west" or the "divide-and-conquer stratagem" in modern business. For instance, a tech giant, seeking to undermine competitors, often circulates rumors of false partnership intentions or acquisition offers, tempting rivals to abandon their existing strategic allies, only to suppress or absorb them once isolated. King Huai of Chu's downfall lay in his failure to discern the essential difference between "six li" and "six hundred li"—that is, his neglect to verify the credibility and deliverability of the other party's promises. In modern corporate decision-making, when faced with alluring "Shangyu territory"—be it colossal orders or exclusive agency rights—one should remain vigilant like Chen Zhen, engaging in "counterfactual reasoning": if the other party genuinely intends to offer benefits, why would they demand the disruption of my existing ecosystem? Concurrently, one must establish "intelligence systems" and "risk-control mechanisms" to validate partners' backgrounds and historical creditworthiness, lest short-term gains cost long-term strategic alliances. In commercial warfare, "vertical and horizontal alliances" are fundamentally games of interest and trust management; trusting a "Zhang Yi"-style adversary lightly may cost territory at best, or precipitate total collapse at worst. Only by transforming the wisdom of "subduing the enemy without fighting" into the resolve of "not credulously trusting while fortifying alliances" can one remain invincible amid the complexities of the market.