第355篇 魏王问张旄

出处:战国策·魏策三

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📜 原文(文言文)

魏王问张旄曰:“吾欲与秦攻韩,何如?”张旄对曰:“韩且坐而亡乎?亡且割地而和乎?”王曰:“韩且割地而和。”张旄曰:“今攻韩,韩必割地以和于秦,秦必受之。韩割地于秦,则秦之力厚矣,非魏之利也。王不如与韩,而亲秦。韩必听,则王因使韩割地于秦,秦必受之。是王失之于韩,而得之于秦也。且王攻韩,韩必惧,惧则必以重宝赂秦,以求免。秦得韩之赂,必不救魏矣。王不如亲秦,使韩割地于秦,秦必喜,而魏得免于兵。此两利之术也。”王曰:“善。”乃与韩亲,而秦果受韩地,魏遂无患。

📖 白话文翻译

King Wei of Wei asked Zhang Mao, "What do you think of joining forces with Qin to attack Han?" Zhang Mao replied, "Will Han sit and await its doom, or will it cede territory to sue for peace?" The King said, "Han will cede territory to sue for peace." Zhang Mao said, "If we attack Han now, Han will surely cede territory to Qin to seek peace, and Qin will certainly accept it. Once Han cedes land to Qin, Qin's power will grow stronger, which bodes ill for Wei. It would be better for Your Majesty to forge amity with Han while drawing close to Qin. Han will surely comply, and then Your Majesty can have Han cede territory to Qin, which Qin will certainly accept. Thus, though Your Majesty may lose Han's trust, you will gain advantage from Qin. Moreover, if Your Majesty attacks Han, Han will be seized with fear, and in fear it will surely bribe Qin with precious treasures to avert calamity. Once Qin receives Han's bribes, it will certainly not come to Wei's rescue. It would be better for Your Majesty to befriend Qin and have Han cede land to Qin—Qin will be delighted, and Wei will be spared the ordeal of war. This is a strategy of mutual benefit." The King said, "Well said." Thereupon he forged amity with Han, and Qin indeed accepted Han's territory, and Wei was thus free from calamity.

💡 商战启示录

Zhang Mao's wisdom lies in transcending direct confrontation, reshaping the landscape of interests to achieve a multi-party win. He discerned the superficial gains of "attacking Han," saw through to the long-term risk of strengthening Qin and isolating Wei, and instead proposed a circuitous strategy of "allying with Han and befriending Qin"—having Han cede territory to Qin, satisfying Qin's expansionist appetite while sparing Wei from direct entanglement in war, thereby preserving Wei's strategic security. This mirrors modern commercial warfare: competition between enterprises should not fixate solely on short-term market share battles, but rather examine the game dynamics across the upstream and downstream of the supply chain. For instance, when two rivals engage in a price war, it often allows upstream suppliers to reap the benefits. A shrewd enterprise, like Zhang Mao, seeks cooperation with its competitor, jointly pressuring suppliers or consolidating resources to achieve a "win-win." Though Apple and Samsung are mortal enemies in the smartphone market, Samsung still supplies screens and chips to Apple, their supply chains deeply intertwined, averting the vicious cycle of a zero-sum game. Zhang Mao's strategy also teaches us: in business negotiations, sometimes voluntarily conceding partial benefits to a third party can defuse direct conflict and carve out a more favorable ecological niche for oneself. A true strategist does not chase momentary victory, but excels at designing solutions acceptable to all parties, thereby standing unassailable amidst complex games.