When the state of Qin attacked Zhao, the King of Zhao sent Zhao He to negotiate for peace, agreeing to cede six cities to Qin. After Qin released Zhao He back to Zhao, the king began to doubt whether the decision to cede territory had been wise and wished to renege on the agreement. Zhao He said: "Qin did not attack Zhao out of affection, nor did it spare Zhao out of aversion. It treats Zhao exactly as a merchant of the marketplace treats his wares—seeking only to profit thereby. Now that Your Majesty has ceded territory to sue for peace, Qin will surely conclude that Zhao is timid and will press its demands even further. It would be better for Your Majesty to cede the territory as a bribe, displaying weakness before Qin. Qin will then grow arrogant and come to despise Zhao, and Zhao, seizing the opportunity, may repair its defenses and prepare to counter it. This is what is meant by the principle: 'To take from another, one must first give to him.'" The King of Zhao said: "Well spoken." Thereupon he ceded the six cities. Qin indeed grew arrogant and ceased to keep watch against Zhao. Zhao was thus able to mend its armor and drill its troops, and in the end repelled Qin.
💡 商战启示录
Zhao Hao's strategy reveals the wisdom of retreating in order to advance and feigning weakness to lure the enemy in modern commercial warfare. In business competition, when facing an onslaught from a formidable rival—be it a price war or market squeeze—a head-on collision often exacts a heavy toll with little prospect of victory. In such moments, one may adopt a "strategic concession," voluntarily ceding a portion of market share or profit to create the illusion that "the opponent has already won," thereby lulling them into complacency and prompting them to scale back their investments. For instance, during the early subsidy wars between Didi and Kuaidi, one side deliberately contracted its front, leading the rival to mistake the move for a broken capital chain and consequently escalate its spending—while in truth, the former was quietly refining its product and marshaling technological strength, ultimately seizing the upper hand in merger negotiations. Likewise, when Huawei first entered the European market, it willingly yielded profits to local carriers and projected weakness before giants like Ericsson; as the latter grew dismissive, Huawei completed its technological accumulation and localization, eventually overtaking them. The crux lies in this: concession is not the end, but a means to buy time and space—by numbing the adversary and amassing strength, one achieves victory through a delayed strike. This demands of the decision-maker both long-term vision and strategic resolve, while ensuring that internal resources can be effectively converted; otherwise, concession degenerates into true defeat.