Someone said to Gong Zhong: "There is now a course of action that is at once loyal to the sovereign, beneficial to the state, and advantageous to oneself—I hope you will consider it carefully. The relations between Qin and Wei are such that if Han aligns with them, calamity is certain to come; if Han does not align with them, calamity will likewise come. Why is this? Because Qin and Wei are strong while Han is weak. Now if the King joins Qin in attacking Chu, then Qin will surely grow arrogant relying on Han, and Chu will surely be fearful because of Han. When Qin is arrogant and Chu is fearful, then Han, in serving Qin, will certainly not be held in high regard. It would be better to secretly ally with Chu while outwardly maintaining good relations with Qin. If Chu gains the esteem of Han, it will surely be grateful to the King; if Qin loses the esteem of Han, it will surely resent the King. That being so, what the King need worry about is only the resentment of Qin. Now if the King, taking advantage of Qin's resentment, bribes Qin with generous benefits, then Qin will surely harbor no suspicion. If Qin harbors no suspicion, then Chu will surely be angered; with Chu angered and Qin unsuspecting, Han may then be free from calamity. I hope you will ponder this deeply."
💡 商战启示录
The essence of this strategy lies in the art of "balance" and the exploitation of "information asymmetry"—in a multi-party game, one does not hastily take sides, but rather employs a blend of the real and the illusory to make every party dependent on you, thereby seizing the initiative. In modern commerce, this mirrors the "multi-sourcing strategy" in supply chain management. For instance, a major tech corporation (such as Apple), in its chip supply, maintains deep collaboration with TSMC while covertly nurturing alternative suppliers like Samsung and Intel. On the surface, it preserves a close relationship with TSMC, yet in reality, it leverages potential substitutes to exert pressure on TSMC, securing better procurement prices and technological priority. Meanwhile, when a competitor (such as Huawei) faces chip supply cutoffs, Apple does not openly support them, but hints in negotiations that "if cooperation falters, we may turn to other partners," thereby balancing relationships and avoiding being "held hostage" by a single ally. Another example is an e-commerce platform (such as Pinduoduo) employing a "dual-faced strategy" between merchants and consumers: outwardly proclaiming "hundred-billion subsidies" to benefit consumers and win their loyalty, while inwardly charging merchants for traffic and using platform rules to foster competition among them, compelling their dependence on the platform. This tactic of "openly aligning with merchants, covertly siding with users" resonates with the ancient adage "covertly allied with Chu, openly befriending Qin"—by sowing distrust and dependency among rivals, one becomes the indispensable "pivot." Yet the boundary of this strategy lies in its limits: if balance is overplayed, trust may collapse on all sides (as seen when certain enterprises, exposed for "feeding on both ends," faced public backlash). Therefore, the shrewd operator must grasp the "measure"—amid the interplay of illusion and reality, always backed by genuine strength, only then can one navigate the game with effortless mastery.