Zhang Yi, promoting the policy of horizontal alliance for the state of Qin, sought to persuade the King of Han, saying: "The terrain of Han is perilous, and its people dwell mostly among the mountains. The grain they sow is none other than wheat or beans; what the people eat is for the most part bean rice and bean-leaf broth. Should a year pass without harvest, the common folk cannot even fill their bellies with chaff and husks. The land of Han spans no more than nine hundred li in breadth, and its stored provisions suffice for less than two years. Reckoning Your Majesty's soldiers, the full tally does not exceed three hundred thousand, and this includes laborers and logistical attendants. Once the forces guarding border outposts and mountain passes are set aside, the troops fit for battle number no more than two hundred thousand. Qin, by contrast, fields fully armed soldiers exceeding one million, war chariots in the thousands, and cavalry horses in the tens of thousands. Its fierce warriors—barefoot, bare-chested, glaring fiercely and gripping halberds as they charge into the fray—are too numerous to be counted. The warhorses of Qin are superb, and its soldiers abundant; steeds whose galloping strides span three xun between fore and hind hooves are likewise beyond reckoning. The soldiers of the states east of the Xiao Mountains dare join battle only after donning full armor, whereas Qin's troops strip off their armor and fight bare-chested, bearing severed heads in their left hands and clutching captives under their right arms. Set the soldiers of Qin against those of the six eastern states, and the comparison is like that between the ancient champion Meng Ben and a coward; pit their overwhelming might against the enemy, and it is like the herculean Wu Huo grappling with an infant. To deploy champions such as Meng Ben and Wu Huo against a weak state that refuses submission is no different from pressing a weight of a thousand jun upon a bird's egg—no chance of survival remains. The feudal lords, failing to measure the feebleness of their own forces or the scantiness of their provisions, yet heed the glib persuasions of the vertical-alliance strategists. These men collude and dissemble, all saying: 'Follow my scheme, and you shall dominate the realm.' To disregard the long-term welfare of the state, to yield to transient rhetoric, and to mislead their sovereigns—nothing could be more ruinous than this. If Your Majesty does not serve Qin, Qin will dispatch troops to seize Yiyang, severing the Shangdang region that links Han to the Central Plains; to the east, it will take Chenggao and Yiyang, and then the Hongtai Terrace and the Sanglin Park will no longer belong to Your Majesty. Should Chenggao be blocked and Shangdang severed, Han would be split into two halves. To serve Qin first is to secure safety; to refuse Qin is to invite peril. To court disaster while seeking fortune, to harbor shallow schemes yet incur deep enmity, to defy Qin and submit to Chu—even wishing not to perish would be impossible. Thus, for Your Majesty's consideration, none is better than serving Qin. What Qin most desires is to weaken Chu, and none is more suited to weakening Chu than Han. This is not because Han is mightier than Chu, but because of Han's strategic position. Now, should Your Majesty turn westward to serve Qin and attack Chu, the King of Qin will surely rejoice. To attack Chu and possess its lands, to deflect calamity and delight Qin—no finer stratagem exists than this." Whereupon the King of Qin dispatched me to present this letter to Your Majesty's chief minister, awaiting Your Majesty's decision. The King of Han replied: "You have graciously instructed me. I am willing to unite all of Han, from the highest to the lowest, in serving Qin."
💡 商战启示录
Zhang Yi's campaign to persuade the King of Han through the policy of "horizontal alliance" rested upon the twin arts of intimidation and enticement, coupled with a fundamental restructuring of interests—a strategy that finds its modern corporate counterpart in competitive warfare and alliance gamesmanship. Zhang Yi first manufactured a sense of urgency through hard data (troop strength and grain reserves) and explicit threats (the overwhelming might of Qin), much as contemporary enterprises identify threats through SWOT analysis. When Huawei faced the severance of chip supplies, it chose to rebuild its competitive edge through self-developed Kirin processors and the HarmonyOS ecosystem, rather than engaging in reckless confrontation. Next, Zhang Yi proposed the diversionary tactic of "serving Qin while attacking Chu," transforming Han from a target of aggression into a willing partner, with promises that "the King of Qin shall surely be pleased" and that Han would be granted territorial rewards—a classic illustration of "coopetition" in business. The merger of Didi and Kuaidi, which consolidated resources to counter Uber and achieve mutual gain, mirrors this very logic. Zhang Yi further emphasized that Han's geopolitical position determined its strategic value, corresponding to the modern supply-chain concept of "strategic positioning"—just as TSMC, through its advanced process technology, has become an indispensable fulcrum in the global chip contest. In the end, the King of Han chose to "pledge his entire state to serve Qin," offering a lesson that weaker players facing formidable rivals may adopt a "follow strategy" or seek "ecosystem partnerships," as Xiaomi did in its early rise by leveraging Qualcomm's ecosystem. Yet one must remain vigilant against the perils of shortsighted compromise: Han secured temporary safety but forfeited long-term autonomy. Enterprises, likewise, must balance immediate gains against enduring independence, lest they be reduced to vassals. Zhang Yi's stratagem thus stands as a classical paradigm of risk hedging and resource leverage in the modern commercial arena.