第19篇 为周最谓魏王

出处:战国策·东周策

语言: 中文 English Español 日本語 한국어 Tiếng Việt ไทย Русский

📜 原文(文言文)

为周最谓魏王曰:“秦知赵之难与齐战也,将恐齐、赵之合也,必阴劲之。赵不敢战,恐秦不己与也,必先阴与齐以弱秦。秦知赵之难与齐战也,将恐齐、赵之合也,必阴劲之。赵不敢战,恐秦不己与也,必先阴与齐以弱秦。是故秦、赵、齐三国之相攻也,犹抱薪救火也,薪不尽,则火不灭也。今王之地,非能广于齐、赵也,而兵非能强于秦也,而三国之交,未有定也,臣恐其为天下笑也。且王尝为秦所擒乎?不如割地以赂秦,与之合纵而攻齐,此孤齐之术也。王何不使人说秦曰:‘魏王请为秦东藩,给秦下兵。’秦必喜,而听之。王因使赵、齐,而秦必伐齐。秦伐齐,赵必救齐,则秦、赵战于齐,而魏坐收其利矣。王若欲存魏,必慎此三者,毋使秦、赵、齐合而攻魏也。”

📖 白话文翻译

Someone spoke to the King of Wei on behalf of Zhou Cui, saying: "Qin knows that Zhao finds it difficult to wage war against Qi, and fearing that Qi and Zhao might unite, it will surely secretly strengthen Zhao. Zhao, not daring to fight Qin and worried that Qin will not come to its aid, will inevitably first secretly ally with Qi to weaken Qin. Thus, when Qin, Zhao, and Qi attack one another, it is like carrying firewood to quench a blaze—until the fuel is spent, the fire will not die. Now Your Majesty's territory is no vaster than that of Qi or Zhao, and your military might is no stronger than Qin's; yet the alliances among these three states remain unsettled, and I fear Your Majesty will be mocked by the world. Moreover, has Your Majesty not suffered humiliation at the hands of Qin? It would be better to cede territory to bribe Qin and join it in a vertical alliance to attack Qi—this is a strategy to isolate Qi. Why does Your Majesty not send an envoy to persuade Qin, saying: 'The King of Wei requests to serve as Qin's eastern vassal and to supply troops for Qin'? Qin will surely be pleased and comply. Your Majesty should then let Zhao and Qi know that Qin is certain to attack Qi. When Qin attacks Qi, Zhao is bound to rescue Qi—then Qin and Zhao will clash on Qi's soil, while Wei reaps the spoils as a bystander. If Your Majesty wishes to preserve Wei, you must act prudently regarding these three points and not allow Qin, Zhao, and Qi to unite in attacking Wei."

💡 商战启示录

The essence of this strategy lies in exploiting the contradictions among various parties, causing powerful states to exhaust one another while weaker states reap the benefits from the sidelines. In modern business, small and medium-sized enterprises facing competition from giants can draw upon this approach. For instance, in the ride-hailing sector, Didi and Kuaidi once engaged in fierce rivalry, yet when Uber entered China, Didi and Kuaidi swiftly merged to form a united front against Uber, ultimately forcing Uber's withdrawal from the Chinese market and leaving Didi in a dominant position. This mirrors the state of Wei allying with Qin to attack Qi, thereby avoiding becoming the target of collective opposition. Another case is when Alibaba and JD.com were locked in e-commerce combat, Pinduoduo carved out a niche by targeting lower-tier markets with low prices, refraining from direct confrontation with the giants while capitalizing on the gaps left by their rivalry to grow rapidly. Wei's strategy also emphasizes "caution in these three matters," namely avoiding entanglement in multi-sided conflicts. Enterprises should assess the prevailing circumstances, refrain from blindly engaging in price wars, and instead seek opportunities for cooperation or adopt a stance of watching from the shore as others clash. For example, in the formulation of 5G standards, Huawei rallied diverse forces to avoid isolation and ultimately emerged as a leader. In sum, the weak can profit from the contests of the strong by skillfully leveraging external forces and engineering a balance of power.