第287篇 孟尝君之赵

出处:战国策·齐策六

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📜 原文(文言文)

孟尝君之赵,谓赵王曰:“文愿借兵以救魏。”赵王曰:“寡人不能。”孟尝君曰:“夫敢借兵者,以忠王也。”王曰:“可得闻乎?”孟尝君曰:“夫赵之兵非能强于魏之兵,魏之兵非能弱于赵也。然而赵之地不岁危而民不岁死,而魏之地岁危而民岁死者,何也?以其西为赵蔽也。今赵不救魏,魏歃盟于秦,是赵与强秦为界也,地亦且岁危,民亦且岁死矣。此文之所以忠于大王也。”赵王许诺,为起兵十万,车三百乘。又北见燕王曰:“先日公子常约两主之交矣。今秦且攻魏,愿大王之救之。”燕王曰:“吾岁不熟二年矣,今又行数千里而以助魏,且奈何?”田文曰:“夫行数千里而救人者,此国之利也。今魏王出国门而望见军,虽欲行数千里而助人,可得乎?”燕王尚未许也。田文曰:“臣效便计于王,王不用臣之忠计,文请行矣。恐天下之将有大变也。”王曰:“大变可得闻乎?”曰:“燕不救魏,魏王折节割地,以国之半与秦,秦必去矣。秦已去魏,魏王悉韩、魏之兵,又西借秦兵,以因赵之众,以四国攻燕,王且何利?利行数千里而助人乎?利出燕南门而望见军乎?则道里近而输又易矣,王何利?”燕王曰:“子行矣,寡人听子。”乃为之起兵八万,车二百乘,以从田文。魏王大喜,曰:“君得燕、赵之兵甚众且亟矣。”秦王大恐,割地请讲于魏。魏因归燕、赵之兵,而封田文。

📖 白话文翻译

Lord Mengchang, Tian Wen, arrived in the state of Zhao and said to the King of Zhao, "I wish to borrow troops from Your Majesty to rescue the state of Wei." The King of Zhao replied, "I cannot lend troops." Lord Mengchang said, "The reason I dare to come and borrow troops is out of loyalty to Your Majesty." The King of Zhao asked, "May I hear your explanation?" Lord Mengchang said, "The military strength of Zhao is not greater than that of Wei, nor is Wei's strength less than Zhao's. Yet Zhao's lands suffer no calamities year after year, and its people do not die in warfare year after year, while Wei's lands suffer calamities year after year, and its people perish in battle year after year. Why is this? Because Wei shields Zhao from Qin in the west. Now, if Zhao does not rescue Wei, Wei will form an alliance with Qin, and then Zhao will stand directly adjacent to mighty Qin. Your lands will then face yearly peril, and your people will die in warfare year after year. This is why I am loyal to Your Majesty." The King of Zhao consented, dispatching one hundred thousand troops and three hundred chariots. Lord Mengchang then traveled north to see the King of Yan, saying, "Previously, our lords had pledged the friendship between our two states. Now Qin is about to attack Wei, and I hope Your Majesty will come to its rescue." The King of Yan said, "Our state has suffered poor harvests for two consecutive years, and now we must march thousands of li to aid Wei—how can this be done?" Tian Wen said, "Marching thousands of li to save others is in the interest of the state. Now, if the King of Wei could see the enemy at his city gates the moment he steps out, would he even have the chance to march thousands of li to aid others?" The King of Yan still refused. Tian Wen said, "I offer Your Majesty a beneficial plan, yet you do not adopt my loyal counsel. I beg to leave. I fear a great upheaval is about to befall the world." The King of Yan said, "Could you tell me of this great upheaval?" Tian Wen said, "If Yan does not rescue Wei, the King of Wei will kneel and cede territory, giving half his state to Qin, and Qin will surely withdraw its troops. After Qin's army departs from Wei, the King of Wei will lead the full forces of Han and Wei, borrow troops from Qin in the west, and unite with the army of Zhao, using the strength of four states to attack Yan. What benefit would Your Majesty have then? Is it more advantageous to march thousands of li to aid others, or to see the enemy just beyond Yan's southern gate? That route would be short and supplies easy to transport—which does Your Majesty deem more favorable?" The King of Yan said, "Go, I shall follow your counsel." Thereupon he raised eighty thousand troops and two hundred chariots for Tian Wen to lead. The King of Wei was overjoyed, saying, "You have obtained troops from Yan and Zhao in great number and with great speed." The King of Qin, greatly alarmed, ceded territory and begged for peace with Wei. Wei then returned the troops of Yan and Zhao and bestowed honors upon Tian Wen.

💡 商战启示录

The key to Lord Mengchang's success lay in his precise identification of each party's core interests, and his design of win-win solutions accordingly. To the state of Zhao, he emphasized the利害关系 of "when the lips are gone, the teeth feel cold"—if Zhao did not rescue Wei, it would be directly exposed to the might of Qin. To the state of Yan, he first created a sense of urgency with "distant water cannot quench a nearby fire," then painted the catastrophic consequence of "if you do not rescue, four states will unite against Yan," while subtly suggesting that rescuing Wei would be low in cost yet high in reward. This mirrors the "restructuring of interest chains" in modern business negotiations: an enterprise must not only articulate its own needs, but also help its partners perceive their own risks and gains. For instance, in supply chain management, when a core supplier faces a crisis, downstream enterprises that consider only short-term costs and withhold assistance may cause the entire chain to collapse, ultimately harming themselves. The strategy of Lord Mengchang was to proactively calculate for the other party the "price of non-cooperation" and the "long-term value of cooperation," even forging alliances by creating a "common enemy"—such as the monopolistic threat of a competitor. Moreover, he skillfully employed a "divide and conquer" approach to communication, tailoring his persuasion logic to each audience rather than delivering a one-size-fits-all appeal. In modern mergers and strategic partnerships, successful negotiators often, like Lord Mengchang, embed their own demands within the strategic anxieties of the other party, making cooperation the rational choice of "the lesser of two evils." This wisdom of strategic interplay, grounded in insight into interests, far surpasses mere pressure or supplication in forging enduring alliances.