第245篇 五国约而攻秦

出处:战国策·韩策一

语言: 中文 English Español 日本語 한국어 Tiếng Việt ไทย Русский

📜 原文(文言文)

五国约而攻秦,楚王为从长,将兵而攻秦。秦惠王患之,欲以割地赂楚,楚王曰:“吾已与五国约,不可背。”秦惠王谓陈轸曰:“吾欲以割地赂楚,楚王不可,奈何?”陈轸曰:“王勿忧,臣请说楚王。”陈轸见楚王曰:“王以五国约而攻秦,秦必割地以赂王。王得地,则五国必怒,而合从必解。王何不阴与秦合,而阳与五国约?如此,则王得地于秦,而五国不怨,楚之霸业可成也。”楚王曰:“善。”乃阴与秦合,而阳与五国约。秦惠王乃以地赂楚,楚王遂与秦和,五国之兵皆罢。

📖 白话文翻译

Five states allied to attack Qin, with King Huai of Chu as the leader of the vertical alliance, commanding the troops in preparation to strike. King Hui of Qin, troubled by this, wished to bribe Chu with ceded territory, but King Huai of Chu said, "I have already sworn an oath with the five states; I cannot betray them." King Hui of Qin said to Chen Zhen, "I wish to bribe Chu with territory, but King Huai refuses—what shall I do?" Chen Zhen replied, "Your Majesty need not worry; allow me to persuade King Huai of Chu." Chen Zhen then had an audience with King Huai and said, "Your Majesty attacks Qin because of the pact with the five states, and Qin will surely cede territory to bribe you. Once Your Majesty gains the land, the five states will certainly be enraged, and the vertical alliance will dissolve. Why not secretly ally with Qin while outwardly maintaining the pact with the five states? In this way, Your Majesty will obtain territory from Qin without incurring the resentment of the five states, and the hegemony of Chu may be achieved." King Huai of Chu said, "Well spoken." Thereupon he secretly allied with Qin while outwardly preserving the pact with the five states. King Hui of Qin then ceded territory to bribe Chu, and King Huai of Chu made peace with Qin, whereupon the armies of the five states all withdrew.

💡 商战启示录

This strategy reveals the game-theoretic wisdom of "building the road in the open while secretly crossing at Chencang," which in modern commercial warfare manifests as "strategic ambiguity" and "two-way gaming." King Huai of Chu outwardly maintained the alliance (public commitment) while secretly transacting with the competitor (the state of Qin) to maximize gains and avoid fighting on two fronts. This parallels the "co-opetition" dynamic in business: a company may simultaneously participate in industry alliances (such as standards-setting organizations) to preserve its ecological niche, yet privately reach technology licensing or market-division agreements with key rivals to secure short-term resources. For instance, Apple and Samsung compete fiercely in the smartphone market while maintaining chip foundry cooperation. King Huai's success lay in "profiting without breaking the covenant"—not tearing up the public agreement, but leveraging information asymmetry to use the alliance as a bargaining chip. Modern enterprises should learn to "leave blank space" in multi-party games: public stances may be firm, but private negotiation channels should remain open—employing "overt strategy" to sustain credibility and "covert strategy" to secure tangible gains. Yet one must guard against "excessive opportunism"—had King Huai been exposed by the five states, his credibility would have collapsed. Therefore, business strategy must balance short-term gains against long-term trust, or, like Huawei within the 5G alliance—participating in international standards while maneuvering against rivals through its "Plan B" contingency—achieve both offense and defense. This is the modern embodiment of that ancient stratagem.