第197篇 楚王将出张子(二十六)

出处:战国策·楚策一

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📜 原文(文言文)

楚王将出张子,恐其败己也,靳尚谓楚王曰:“臣请随张子,侥得事焉。”楚王曰:“诺。”靳尚遂行。张子之楚,楚王赐之上卿,靳尚因谓张子曰:“臣请为王奉之。”张子曰:“子欲何之?”靳尚曰:“臣请事王。”张子怒曰:“子以王为可欺乎?子之楚,欲因王以成事也,今王已用子,而子欲去之,何也?”靳尚曰:“臣非敢去王也,臣闻张子之楚,王赐之上卿,臣窃以为王厚于张子,而薄于臣,故臣欲事王,以观王意。”张子曰:“善。子姑待之。”靳尚出,谓楚王曰:“张子知臣之欲事王也,故怒臣,臣恐其以臣故,不利于王。”楚王曰:“子姑就舍,吾图之。”居数日,张子谓楚王曰:“臣请归。”楚王曰:“子去,吾谁与处?”张子曰:“臣闻靳尚欲事王,王未之许也。臣请归,以观其变。”楚王乃许之。张子遂行,靳尚果以事去楚。

📖 白话文翻译

King of Chu was about to send Zhang Zi away from the state of Chu, fearing that he might harm his interests. Jin Shang said to the King of Chu, "Allow me to follow Zhang Zi; perhaps there may be an opportunity to accomplish something." The King of Chu agreed. When Zhang Zi arrived in Chu, the King bestowed upon him the rank of Senior Minister. Jin Shang took the occasion to say to Zhang Zi, "I am willing to serve you." Zhang Zi asked, "What is it that you wish to do?" Jin Shang replied, "I wish to serve the Great King." Zhang Zi said angrily, "Do you think the Great King can be deceived? You came to Chu, seeking to achieve great things by relying on the Great King. Now that the Great King has already shown you favor, you wish to leave—why is this?" Jin Shang said, "I dare not leave the Great King. I have heard that when you, Zhang Zi, arrived in Chu, the Great King bestowed upon you the rank of Senior Minister. Privately, I feel that the Great King treats you generously, yet treats me with scant regard. Therefore, I wish to serve the Great King, to observe his intentions." Zhang Zi said, "Very well, wait for the time being." After Jin Shang left, he said to the King of Chu, "Zhang Zi knows that I wish to serve you, O King, and so he became angry with me. I fear that because of me, he may act against Your Majesty." The King of Chu said, "Return to your residence for now; I shall consider this matter." Several days later, Zhang Zi said to the King of Chu, "Allow me to return to my own state." The King of Chu said, "If you leave, with whom shall I consort?" Zhang Zi said, "I have heard that Jin Shang wishes to serve Your Majesty, and that Your Majesty has not yet consented. I request to return to my state, to observe how matters unfold." The King of Chu then agreed. Zhang Zi thereupon left the state of Chu, and Jin Shang, indeed, for certain reasons, also departed from the state of Chu.

💡 商战启示录

This stratagem exemplifies the classic dynamics of workplace maneuvering and information manipulation. By fabricating a "facade of loyalty" and employing "divisive misinformation," Jin Shang succeeded in sowing suspicion in the King of Chu's mind against Zhang Zi, ultimately achieving his goal of marginalizing a rival. In the modern business world, similar tactics frequently appear in power struggles among senior executives. For instance, when two vice presidents of a technology company vied for the CEO succession, one deliberately hinted to the board that the other was "exploring other opportunities," while forging "evidence" of the rival's contacts with headhunters—leading the board to distance itself from the opponent and allowing the schemer to ascend. Yet this strategy carries extreme risk: once exposed, the backlash can be devastating. What deserves greater emulation is Zhang Zi's response: upon detecting Jin Shang's provocation, he refrained from direct confrontation and instead retreated to advance—voluntarily resigning, thereby compelling the King of Chu to make a decision under asymmetric information, which ultimately laid bare Jin Shang's true intentions. Business warfare insights: 1) Beware of "loyalty" and "confidential reports" conveyed through "third parties," as they often carry hidden agendas; 2) When faced with slander, a timely "strategic retreat" can force the opponent to reveal their vulnerabilities; 3) The most sophisticated strategy is not to attack the adversary directly, but to manipulate the information environment so that decision-makers arrive at misjudgments favorable to you. Modern enterprises should establish transparent communication mechanisms to reduce the internal attrition caused by such zero-sum games.