第109篇 燕王哙既立

出处:战国策·燕策一

语言: 中文 English Español 日本語 한국어 Tiếng Việt ไทย Русский

📜 原文(文言文)

燕王哙既立,苏秦死于齐。苏代之在燕也,相子之,欲以计倾燕而夺之。苏代为齐使于燕,燕王问之曰:“齐王亦何如主也?”对曰:“必不霸矣。”燕王曰:“何也?”对曰:“不信其臣。”苏代欲以激燕王以尊子之也。于是燕王大信子之。子之因遗苏代百金,听其所使。鹿毛寿谓燕王曰:“不如以国让子之。人谓尧贤者,以其让天下于许由,许由不受,有让天下之名,实不失天下。今王以国让相子之,子之必不敢受,是王与尧同行也。”燕王因举国属子之,子之大重。或曰:“禹授益,而以启人为吏。及老,而以启为不足任天下,传之益也。启与支党攻益而夺之天下。是禹名传天下于益,其实令启自取之。今王言属国子之,而吏无非太子人者,是名属子之,而实太子用事也。”王因收印,自三百石吏而效之子之。子之南面行王事,而哙老不听政,顾为臣,国事皆决子之。子之三年,燕国大乱,百姓恫怨。将军市被、太子平谋,将攻子之。储子谓齐宣王曰:“因而仆之,破燕必矣。”王因令章子将五都之兵,以因北地之众以伐燕。燕君哙死,齐大胜,燕子之亡。二年,而燕人立公子平,是为燕昭王。

📖 白话文翻译

After King Kuai of Yan ascended the throne, Su Qin was assassinated in Qi. At that time, Su Dai was in Yan and formed an alliance with Prime Minister Zi Zhi, plotting to undermine the state of Yan and seize power through schemes. Su Dai, serving as an envoy from Qi, arrived in Yan, and the King of Yan asked him, "What kind of ruler is the King of Qi?" Su Dai replied, "He will surely never achieve hegemony." The King of Yan asked, "Why?" Su Dai said, "Because he does not trust his own ministers." Su Dai spoke these words with the intention of provoking the King of Yan into placing even greater trust in Zi Zhi. Thereupon, the King of Yan came to trust Zi Zhi profoundly. Zi Zhi, in gratitude, presented Su Dai with a hundred yi of gold, to be used at his discretion. Lu Mao Shou then said to the King of Yan, "It would be better to yield the state to Zi Zhi. People praise Yao as a sage ruler because he offered the empire to Xu You, and when Xu You declined, Yao gained the renown of abdication without actually losing the empire. Now, if Your Majesty yields the state to Prime Minister Zi Zhi, he will surely not dare to accept it, and thus Your Majesty will share the same virtue as Yao." The King of Yan thereupon entrusted the state to Zi Zhi, whose standing was greatly elevated. Another voice then arose, saying, "Yu passed the empire to Yi, yet appointed men of Qi's faction to official posts. When Yu grew old, believing Qi incapable of governing the empire, he passed it to Yi. Later, Qi and his partisans attacked Yi and seized the empire. Thus Yu, in name, yielded the empire to Yi, but in reality, he let Qi take it by force. Now Your Majesty declares the state entrusted to Zi Zhi, yet no official is not a man of the Crown Prince—this is a nominal entrustment to Zi Zhi, while in truth the Crown Prince governs." The King of Yan then withdrew the official seals, and all officials from three hundred shi of grain upward were placed under Zi Zhi's authority. Zi Zhi sat facing south and exercised the king's power, while King Kuai of Yan, aged and no longer attending to affairs, became a subject instead, with all matters of state decided by Zi Zhi. After Zi Zhi had governed for three years, great turmoil engulfed Yan, and the people harbored deep resentment. General Shi Bei and Crown Prince Ping plotted to attack Zi Zhi. Chu Zi said to King Xuan of Qi, "Seize this opportunity to invade Yan, and victory is certain." King Xuan of Qi thereupon ordered Zhang Zi to lead the troops of the five capitals, reinforced by forces from the northern regions, to attack Yan. King Kuai of Yan perished, Qi achieved a great triumph, and Zi Zhi fled. Two years later, the people of Yan installed Prince Ping as ruler—this was King Zhao of Yan.

💡 商战启示录

The tragedy of King Kuai of Yan stemmed from his blind credulity toward slanderous counsel, yielding core authority with reckless ease, which plunged his domain into internal chaos and invited external encroachment. In modern commerce, this serves as a caution that leaders must guard against "information cocoons" and "cultures of flattery." For instance, a tech CEO who over-trusted a handful of senior executives, dismissed grassroots feedback, and recklessly expanded non-core ventures ultimately saw his capital chain snap and his company acquired by rivals. Conversely, Huawei's Ren Zhengfei champions the maxim "let those who hear the guns call for fire," employing a rotating CEO system and democratic deliberation to avert excessive concentration of power, ensuring strategy rests on authentic market intelligence. King Kuai's errors were threefold: first, he failed to scrutinize the motives of "advisors" like Su Dai and Lu Maoshou, whose counsel served private gain; second, he established no mechanism of checks and balances, entrusting the entirety of state affairs to Zi Zhi without oversight; third, he neglected internal discord—the clash between the Crown Prince and Zi Zhi—failing to resolve it in time, leaving it to be exploited from without. In the arena of commerce, leaders should institute multi-channel information-gathering systems, such as regular direct engagement with frontline staff and customers; establish independent boards or advisory councils to preclude "one-man rule"; and subject major decisions to stress tests and scenario simulations, lest personal bias or short-term gains erode long-term competitiveness. Equally, one must be wary of "abdication-style" partnerships—nominal delegation that in truth forfeits control, as when founders prematurely install professional managers without retaining core decision-making power, allowing corporate strategy to drift from its original purpose. That King Zhao of Yan later raised the Golden Terrace to attract talent and turned defeat into triumph demonstrates that rebuilding trust and gathering broad wisdom after crisis are the keys to revival.