King Huai of Chu detained Zhang Yi and intended to put him to death. Jin Shang, seeking to save Zhang Yi, said to the king, "If Your Majesty detains Zhang Yi, the King of Qin will surely be enraged. When the feudal lords see that Chu has lost the support of Qin, they will surely hold Your Majesty in contempt." Jin Shang then spoke to Zheng Xiu, the king's favored consort, saying, "The King of Qin holds Zhang Yi in great affection, yet our king desires to kill him. Now the King of Qin is prepared to offer six districts of Shangyong as a bribe to Chu, to present a beautiful maiden to the King of Chu, and to send court singers skilled in song as her dowry. Should the King of Chu value the territory, he will honor Qin, and the Qin beauty will surely gain favor, while you, my lady, will be cast aside. It would be better for you to persuade the king to release Zhang Yi." Zheng Xiu thereupon urged King Huai to set Zhang Yi free, and he did so.
💡 商战启示录
Jin Shang's lobbying strategy stands as a classic model in modern commercial warfare, with its core lying in "interest exchange" and "leveraging momentum to apply pressure." First, he pointed out to King Huai of Chu the consequences of executing Zhang Yi—Chu would incur Qin's wrath and lose a powerful ally, resulting in a decline in international standing. This approach cuts in from the angle of "threat perception," akin to reminding one's counterpart in modern business negotiations of the risks of "losing our partnership will lead to market share erosion or supply chain disruption." Next, Jin Shang turned to Zheng Xiu, exploiting her immediate interests in "rivalry for imperial favor" by depicting the threat of Qin beauties entering Chu after Zhang Yi's death, thereby prompting her to actively dissuade the King. This corresponds to the technique of "influencing key decision-makers" in business strategy: rather than directly persuading the CEO, one conveys information through trusted allies (such as the CFO or core executives), because their concerns over personal interests often carry greater persuasive weight. This case also exemplifies the use of "information asymmetry": Jin Shang fabricated a bribery scheme attributed to Qin—though not necessarily true—it precisely struck the psychological vulnerabilities of both King Huai and Zheng Xiu. In modern corporate negotiations, similar tactics often manifest as "bluffing" or "manufacturing competition," such as hinting to a buyer that other clients are bidding, thereby closing the deal. However, one must remain vigilant about ethical boundaries, as excessive deception may undermine long-term trust. In sum, successful commercial lobbying requires insight into the chains of interests among all parties, pursuing "self-interest" under the guise of "benefiting others," and achieving objectives through strategic maneuvering.