第492篇 楚王使景鲤之秦

出处:战国策·楚策一

语言: 中文 English Español 日本語 한국어 Tiếng Việt ไทย Русский

📜 原文(文言文)

楚王使景鲤之秦。客谓秦王曰:“景鲤,楚王所甚爱,王不如留之以市地。楚王听,则不用兵而得地;不听,则杀景鲤,更不与不如景鲤留,是便计也。”秦王乃留景鲤。景鲤使人说秦王曰:“臣见王之权轻天下,而地不可得也。臣之来也,固闻王之使人请地于楚,而楚王言不可。臣之来也,固请之,而楚王不听。然则王之所以求于楚者,不可得也。臣闻之,有兼并之志者,必先示之以弱;有吞天下之心者,必先屈己以从人。今王留臣,是示天下以无信,而自亏于楚也。且楚之强,非独楚也,秦之强,亦非独秦也。王不如遣臣归,以成楚、秦之交,则楚、秦皆强,而天下莫之能害。若王留臣,则楚必怒,秦必弱,而天下必且图秦矣。”秦王乃遣景鲤。

📖 白话文翻译

King of Chu sent Jing Li as an envoy to the state of Qin. A retainer said to the King of Qin, "Jing Li is greatly favored by the King of Chu. It would be wise for Your Majesty to detain him and use this to demand territory from Chu. If the King of Chu agrees, then you will gain land without deploying troops; if he refuses, then kill Jing Li and await another envoy of lesser stature—this remains a profitable stratagem." The King of Qin thus detained Jing Li. Jing Li then sent someone to persuade the King of Qin, saying, "I foresee that Your Majesty will lose prestige among the feudal lords, and gain no territory either. When I came, I had heard that Your Majesty had sent envoys to demand land from Chu, and the King of Chu refused. I came originally to plead on behalf of Qin, but the King of Chu would not listen. As such, what Your Majesty seeks from Chu shall not be obtained. I have heard that one who aspires to annex other states must first appear weak before them; one who harbors ambition to swallow the world must first humble himself to yield to others. Now, by detaining me, Your Majesty displays faithlessness to the world and breeds enmity with Chu. Moreover, the strength of Chu lies not in Chu alone; the strength of Qin lies not in Qin alone. It would be better for Your Majesty to release me and thereby foster amity between Qin and Chu, so that both states grow strong, and none under heaven can harm them. If Your Majesty detains me, Chu will surely be enraged, Qin will surely weaken, and the feudal lords will inevitably plot against Qin." The King of Qin then released Jing Li to return home.

💡 商战启示录

Jing Li, when detained by the powerful Qin state, did not meet force with force, but instead resolved the crisis through a logic of "showing weakness" and "mutual benefit." He made it clear: if Qin detained him, it would not only lose credibility before the world but also provoke Chu's resistance, leading to mutual ruin; conversely, releasing him to return home and forging an alliance would benefit both sides. This corresponds to breaking the "prisoner's dilemma" in modern business—when a company holds key clients or suppliers hostage as leverage, it may gain in the short term, but in the long run, it erodes trust, prompting the other party to seek alternatives or even ally with competitors to strike back. For example, a tech giant once used patent litigation to cripple startups; though it won the lawsuits, it lost the trust of the developer community, causing its ecosystem to wither. Jing Li's strategy teaches us that in negotiations, one should transcend "zero-sum games" and seek "positive-sum solutions." True business wisdom lies in leaving room for the other side even when holding the advantage, replacing coercion with cooperation to build long-term mutual trust. Consider Apple and Samsung: despite fierce patent battles, they remain closely intertwined in supply chains, for both understand that a complete rupture would only let a third party reap the benefits. Jing Li's persuasion reminds decision-makers: short-term leverage is less valuable than long-term credibility, inducement outweighs intimidation, and alliance surpasses confrontation. In globalized competition, this wisdom of "retreating to advance" often enables enterprises to turn rivals into allies and achieve win-win outcomes.