Zhang Yi wished to borrow the forces of Qin to rescue Wei. The King of Wei said, "Qin harbors resentment against Wei—why should it lend us troops?" Zhang Yi replied, "Qin's treatment of Wei is not born of kindness, but of coveting Wei's territory. Now that Wei is in peril, Qin fears Wei will turn away and ally with Chu, and so wishes to lend troops for its rescue. I beg to persuade the King of Qin on Your Majesty's behalf, so that Qin may harbor no suspicion toward Wei." The King of Wei said, "Well spoken." Thereupon Zhang Yi said to the King of Qin, "The King of Wei now faces urgent distress and hopes to obtain Qin's forces for his own deliverance. I fear that if Qin does not lend troops, Wei will turn instead to Chu, and thus Qin will lose a neighbor and gain an enemy. It would be better for Your Majesty to lend the troops, thereby securing Wei's allegiance and displaying to Chu the unfathomable resolve of Qin." The King of Qin said, "Well done." And so he lent the forces to Wei.
💡 商战启示录
Zhang Yi's strategy is, in essence, a classic demonstration of "strategic alliance" and "interest binding" in modern business. He discerned the true nature of the triangular game among Qin, Wei, and Chu: Qin did not genuinely cherish Wei, but rather feared that Wei would tilt toward Chu, thereby shifting the balance of power. In commercial warfare, aid or cooperation between enterprises is often motivated not by goodwill, but by concerns over the competitive landscape. For instance, when a tech giant injects capital into a key small supplier in its supply chain, the surface rationale is support, but the underlying intent is to prevent that supplier from being acquired by a rival, thereby preserving the integrity of its own ecosystem. Zhang Yi's brilliance further lies in "showing Chu the unpredictable"—by borrowing troops to send ambiguous signals to Chu, he deterred it from rash action. Modern enterprises likewise often release signals of "we are bound together" to the market through strategic investments or public collaborations, thereby intimidating potential entrants. The core of this strategy is: to bind one's own interests deeply with the security of another party, making the cost of "losing you" greater than the expense of "helping you," so that the other party proactively provides resources. However, one must be wary that such alliances are fragile—once the interest landscape shifts, so-called "rescue" may instantly turn into "harvest." Therefore, when leveraging external strength, one must, like Zhang Yi, pre-design persuasive narratives and mechanisms of interest exchange, ensuring that both sides obtain what they need, rather than relying unilaterally.