Someone said to the King of Wei: "King Zhao of Qin said to his attendants, 'Now, compared with Qin, which of the states of Han and Wei is stronger?' The attendants all replied, 'Han and Wei are weaker than Qin.' King Zhao then asked, 'Now, compared with Qin, which of Han and Wei is the weaker?' The attendants all replied, 'Han and Wei are weaker than Qin.' King Zhao said, 'If that is so, I wish to launch an expedition against Han and Wei—what do you think of it?' The attendants all said, 'Han and Wei are weak and can indeed be attacked.' King Zhao said, 'I have heard that the rulers of Han and Wei are both wise sovereigns, their ministers are all good ministers, and their people are harmonious. Now to attack them would be to cast away what I desire and to set up what I resent. I fear it would be difficult to succeed.' The attendants all said, 'Your Majesty's plan is mistaken. Now the rulers of Han and Wei are not wise sovereigns, their ministers are not good ministers, and their people are not harmonious. How do we know this? In former times, when Qin fought with Han and Wei at Yique, Qin won a great victory, and the rulers of Han and Wei both faced north and submitted as vassals, while their people wept with resentment. Now their rulers do not cultivate virtue, their ministers are not loyal, and their people are not harmonious—therefore they may be attacked.' King Zhao said, 'Well said.' Thereupon he raised troops to attack Han and Wei, and the rulers of Han and Wei, greatly alarmed, sent Su Dai to persuade the King of Qin, saying: 'I have heard that one who would be king does not deceive the multitudes, and one who would be hegemon does not deceive neighboring states. Now Your Majesty attacks Han and Wei—this is to deceive neighboring states. I fear that the scholars of the world will all turn against Qin.' The King of Qin thereupon halted his military campaign."
💡 商战启示录
This strategic discourse reveals a crucial insight in commercial warfare: decision-makers must guard against internal information bias and carefully assess the true strength of their adversaries. King Zhaoxiang of Qin initially judged Han and Wei to be governed by "worthy rulers and virtuous ministers," yet his courtiers, seeking to cater to his expansionist ambitions, deliberately disparaged the enemy, distorting the truth. This serves as a warning to modern corporate executives: when formulating competitive strategy, reliance on one-sided internal reports or sycophantic analysis can easily lead to grave miscalculations of market conditions. For instance, Nokia, during the era of smartphones, continued to emphasize the advantages of feature phones internally, overlooking the rise of Apple and Android, and ultimately missed its window for transformation. Conversely, King Zhaoxiang ultimately heeded the external counsel of Su Dai, realizing that "deceiving one's neighbors" would erode long-term credibility, and thus halted his campaign. This parallels the business world, where companies should value external advisors and market feedback to avoid falling into an "information cocoon." Moreover, "striking" in commercial warfare refers not only to attacking rivals but also to aggressive strategies such as mergers and acquisitions or price wars. If one acts solely on momentary superiority without regard for the opponent's latent resilience—such as the "harmony among the people" of Han and Wei—one may invite a protracted war of attrition. In modern cases, the subsidy war between Didi and Kuaidi serves as an example: had they persisted in reckless bloodletting without considering market reactions and regulatory risks, both might have suffered mutual ruin; their eventual merger was a prudent choice. Thus, the wisdom of this passage teaches us: leaders must balance internal and external information, anchoring their decisions on long-term credibility and ecosystem health rather than short-term strength.