The state of Qi launched an attack on Song, and the situation in Song became critical. Su Dai thereupon wrote a letter to the King of Song, saying: "The military strength of Qin and Zhao is by no means greater than that of Qi, yet if Qi attacks Song, it will surely reap benefits for Qin and Zhao. Why do I say this? Song is a small state, while Qi is a great one—Qi is certain to desire its annexation. However, when Qi attacks Song, Qin and Zhao will inevitably come to its rescue. Thus, Qi's assault on Song is like shooting through a festering sore with a crossbow of a thousand jun—there can be no hope of survival. Moreover, while Qi is attacking Song, Qin and Zhao will surely dispatch important envoys and present lavish gifts to sow discord between Qi and Song. Though Song is small, its cunning people still harbor the ambition of a state with ten thousand chariots. If Qi cannot prevail, then its own state will be imperiled; if it does prevail, it will only be working for the benefit of Qin and Zhao. Therefore, the survival or ruin of Song is not a matter of profit for Qi, but rather a matter of profit for Qin and Zhao. Would it not be better for Your Majesty to have Song ally with Qi, presenting generous tribute to delay Qi's advance? Once Qi obtains Song's wealth, it will surely withdraw its troops. Then Qin and Zhao will be angered that Qi has betrayed them, and Qi, fearing their condemnation, will certainly return Song's gifts and offer apologies to Qin and Zhao. In this way, Song will preserve itself without exertion, Qi will retreat without battle, and Qin and Zhao will gain advantage without even forming close ties. I beg Your Majesty to consider this carefully." The King of Song replied, "Well said." He thereupon presented Qi with five hundred chariots and a thousand catties of gold, and Qi withdrew its forces.
💡 商战启示录
The essence of Su Dai's strategy lies in "leveraging momentum" and "turning adversaries into allies," resolving direct conflict through the exchange of interests. In modern commercial warfare, this manifests as "coopetition"—rather than clashing head-on with a formidable rival, one proactively concedes certain benefits, introduces a third party to create balance, or alters the dynamics of the game. For instance, during the subsidy wars between Didi and Kuaidi, both sides suffered immense losses, and it was ultimately under pressure from capital that they merged, averting a mutually destructive outcome. An even more fitting example is Huawei's response to U.S. sanctions: rather than confronting directly, it adjusted its supply chain and reached a patent settlement with Qualcomm, trading short-term gains for room to survive, before seeking long-term breakthroughs. Similarly, when small enterprises face suppression from industry giants, they may choose to collaborate within the giants' ecosystems—Pinduoduo, in its early days, leveraged WeChat's traffic rather than challenging Alibaba head-on. Su Dai's strategy also reminds us: discern the true motives of one's opponent—Qi did not simply seek to destroy Song, but feared the chain reaction of Qin and Zhao's intervention. Therefore, in business negotiations, identifying the counterpart's "weak spots" and "concerns," and breaking deadlocks through interest exchanges, often proves more effective than direct confrontation. Moreover, "retreating in order to advance" can buy time to reorganize resources, just as Song used its wealth to gain a respite. Modern enterprises should learn to "pay protection fees" or make "strategic concessions" in times of crisis—but only on the premise of clearly defining their core interests and bottom lines, lest they become mere pawns in another's game.