📖 읽기 자료
The concept of 'signaling theory' in economics suggests that in situations of information asymmetry, one party may use observable actions or qualities to convey credible information about unobservable attributes. These signals are costly to fake, making them reliable indicators. For example, a job applicant with a prestigious degree signals high ability, because acquiring that degree required significant effort and intelligence. Similarly, a company offering a warranty signals product quality, as only confident producers would bear the cost of potential repairs. The key is that the signal must be more costly for low-quality individuals or firms to imitate.
🎧 듣기 강의
Professor: Let me give you a real-world example from the used car market, which economists love. Suppose you want to buy a used car, but you can't tell if it's a lemon or a peach. The seller knows, but you don't. How can a seller convince you that the car is reliable? They might offer a free three-month warranty. Now, think about this: If the car were a lemon, the seller would likely face many repair claims during those three months, costing them money. So offering a warranty is a costly signal—only a seller with a genuinely reliable car can afford to make that offer. A seller with a bad car would either lose money on repairs or expose themselves to customer complaints. So the warranty acts as a credible signal of quality, helping you decide to buy from that seller rather than one who offers no warranty.